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1. Introduction 
 
There is nothing more frustrating for critics of neoclassical economics than the 
argument that neoclassical economics is a figment of their imagination; that, 
simply, there is scientific economics and there is speculative hand-waiving (by 
those who have never really grasped the finer points of mainstream economic 
theory). In this sense, neoclassicism resembles racism: while ever present and 
dominant, no one claims to be guided by it. Critics must find a clear definition of 
neoclassicism if only in order to liberate neoclassical economists from the temp-
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tation to barricade themselves behind infantile arguments viz. the non-existence 
of their school of thought. Then, the good debate may begin. 
In this chapter, we offer a definition of neoclassical economics which turns 
on three crucial axioms and which, in conjunction with one another, as we shall 
claim, underpin all (and only) neoclassical theory.
1 Later, we argue that these 
very axioms are simultaneously responsible for: (a) the difficulty mainstream 
economics faces when it comes to illuminating economic and social reality, and 
(b) the discursive success of neoclassical economics which gives it an effective 
(politically driven) stranglehold over alternative modes of economic reasoning.  
We think our definition of neoclassical economics is important because 
critics are often caught off-guard by sophisticated neoclassicists (see Dasgupta, 
2002) who take advantage of gaps in existing definitions in order to turn criti-
cisms on their head. In short, the critique of neoclassical economics is bound to 
be as effective as sophisticated is its definition of the opposition. For instance, 
criticism that neoclassical economics necessarily posits hyper-rational bargain-
hunters, never able to resist an act which brings them the tiniest increase in ex-
pected net returns, is apt but not telling. There are plenty of neoclassical models 
featuring boundedly rational agents; even utterly irrational ones (e.g. evolution-
ary game theory; for a critical review in the spirit of this chapter, see Har-
greaves-Heap and Varoufakis, 2004). Similarly with criticism focussed on ‘neo-
classical features’ like market-clearing, selfish individualism or Pareto optimal-
ity. None of these cut ice because, though these features are usually present in 
neoclassical modelling, they are not necessary features of some neoclassical 
model. 
Thus, as long as critics’ slings and arrows are directed against features of 
neoclassical economics that the latter can shed strategically, like a threatened 
lizard ‘loses’ its tail, they shall miss their target. Nevertheless, we do believe that 
there are at least three features of neoclassical economics that cannot be so shed; 
and, therefore, if the critics concentrate on them they shall, at the very least, 
force neoclassicists to engage in a fruitful dialogue. The single most promising 
prize from such a development ought to be the clarification of the origin and na-
ture of the greatest paradox in social science: that mainstream economics is as 
dominant as it is unappetising (even to some of its own practitioners). 
In this sense, our axiomatic definition of neoclassicism, rather than being 
an idle methodological exercise, aims at exposing the root-cause of mainstream 
economics’ failure to say much that is helpful about the contemporary economic 
world. And it throws useful light on the reasons why such failure, instead of 
weakening neoclassicism, has reinforced its hold over the imagination of both 
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the elites and the public at large. However, this is a longer argument which we 
shall only touch upon here (see Arnsperger and Varoufakis, 2005, for more).  
Once upon a time, it could be argued that neoclassical economics is typi-
fied by a familiar melange of theoretical practices: positing an equilibrium in the 
labour market, the habitual recourse to Say’s Law, the assumption that the inter-
est rate will adjust automatically so as to equalise investment and savings, the 
depiction of capitalist growth a la Robert Solow and company, the imposition of 
Cobb-Doublas or CES production and utility functions etc. Nowadays, any at-
tempt to define neoclassicism by reference to these practices is music to the neo-
classical ear: For there is an endless list of mainstream models which distance 
themselves from some, if not all, of the above. One of two conclusions appear in 
front of us: Either the mainstream has moved on from neoclassicism (as neoclas-
sical economists claim) or the definition of neoclassicism needs to be re-thought 
and abstracted from a list of neoclassical practices like the one above. We 
choose and latter. So, the remainder of this chapter concentrates primarily on the 
three axioms which we think lie at the heart of neoclassical economic theory, old 
and new alike.  
 
2. The first axiom of neoclassical economics: methodological individualism 
 
Unsophisticated critics often identify economic neoclassicism with models in 
which all agents are perfectly informed. Or fully instrumentally rational. Or ex-
cruciatingly selfish. Defining neoclassicism in this manner would perhaps be apt 
in the 1950s but, nowadays, it leaves almost all of modern neoclassical theory 
out of the definition, therefore strengthening the mainstream’s rejoinders. In-
deed, the last thirty years of neoclassical economics have been marked by an 
explosion of models in which economic actors are imperfectly informed, some 
times other-regarding, frequently irrational (or boundedly rational, as the current 
jargon would have it) etc. In short, Homo Economicus has evolved to resemble 
us more.  
None of these brilliant theoretical advances have, however, dislodged the 
neoclassical vessel from its methodological anchorage. Neoclassical theory re-
tains its roots firmly within liberal individualist social science. The method is 
still unbendingly of the analytic-synthetic type: the socio-economic phenomenon 
under scrutiny is to be analysed by focusing on the individuals whose actions 
brought it about; understanding fully their ‘workings’ at the individual level; 
and, finally, synthesising the knowledge derived at the individual level in order 
to understand the complex social phenomenon at hand. In short, neoclassical 
theory follows the watchmaker’s method who, faced with a strange watch, stud-
ies its function by focusing on understanding, initially, the function of each of its 
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cogs and wheels. To the neoclassical economist, the latter are the individual 
agents who are to be studied, like the watchmaker’ cogs and  wheels, independ-
ently of the social whole their actions help bring about.  
So, the first feature of the ‘body of theory’ we think of as neoclassical is its 
methodological individualism: the idea that socio-economic explanation must 
be sought at the level of the individual agent. Note two things: First, this was not 
the method of classical economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Or, 
indeed, of Keynes. Or Hayek. Secondly, this proclivity is fully in tune with the 
mid-19
th Century angloceltic liberal individualism (though the opposite does not 
hold) as it imposes axiomatically a strict separation of structure from agency, 
insisting that socio-economic explanation, at any point in time, must move from 
agency to structure, with the latter being understood as the crystallisation of 
agents’ past acts.  We shall argue later that this strict separation is central in not 
only defining but also undermining the most recent claims of neoclassicism. 
It is, we think, indisputable that all the new manifestations of what we term 
neoclassicism still subscribe to methodological individualism. While it is true 
that mainstream economists have, during the last few decades, acknowledged 
that the agent is a creature of her social context, and thus that social structure 
and individual agency are messily intertwined, their models retain the distinction 
and place the burden of explanation on the individual. Individual worker effort is 
nowadays often modelled as a function of sectoral unemployment (e.g. effi-
ciency wage models), and the firms’ micro-strategies reflect the macroeconomic 
environment. Nevertheless, and despite these interesting linkages between the 
micro-agent and the macro-phenomenon, the explanatory trajectory remains one 
that begins from the agent and maps, unidirectionally, onto the social structure. 
 
3. The second axiom of neoclassical economics: methodological instrumen-
talism 
 
We label the second feature of neoclassical economics methodological instru-
mentalism: all behaviour is preference-driven or, more precisely, it is to be un-
derstood as a means for maximising preference-satisfaction.
2 Preference is 
given, current, fully determining, and strictly separate from both belief (which 
simply helps the agent predict uncertain future outcomes) and from the means 
employed. Everything we do and say is instrumental to preference-satisfaction 
so much so that there is no longer any philosophical room for questioning 
whether the agent will act on her preferences. In effect, neoclassical theory is a 
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narrow version of consequentialism in which the only consequence that matters 
is the extent to which an homogeneous index of preference-satisfaction is maxi-
mised.
3
Methodological instrumentalism’s roots are traceable in David Hume’s 
Treatise of Human Nature (1739/40) in which the Scottish philosopher famously 
divided the human decision making process in three distinct modules: Passions, 
Belief and Reason. Passions provide the destination, Reason slavishly steers a 
course that attempts to get us there, drawing upon a given set of Beliefs regard-
ing the external constraints and the likely consequences of alternative actions. It 
is not difficult to see the lineage with standard microeconomics: the person is 
defined as a bundle of preferences, her beliefs reduce to a set of subjective prob-
ability density functions, which help convert her preferences into expected utili-
ties, and, lastly, her Reason is the cold-hearted optimiser whose authority does 
not extend beyond maximising these uilities. However, it is a mistake to think 
that Hume would have approved. For his Passions are too unruly to fit neatly in 
some ordinal or expected utility function. It took the combined efforts of Jeremy 
Bentham and the late 19
th Century neoclassicists to tame the Passions suffi-
ciently before they could initially be reduced to a unidimensional index of pleas-
ure before turning into smooth, double differentiable utility functions. 
During the tumultuous 20
th Century, neoclassicists invested greatly in 
bleaching all psychology out of the rational agent’s decision making process. All 
hints of a philosophical discussion regarding the rationality of homo economicus 
were thus removed. People could, and ‘should’, be modelled as if they possessed 
consistent preferences which guide their behaviour automatically. The question 
of whether all rational women and men are condemned to maximise some utility 
function all the time became…nonsensical. Thus, instrumentalism lost its con-
nection to the philosophies of Hume, Bentham or Mill and became a technical 
move that economists made instinctively with the same nonchalance as that of 
an accomplished artist preparing his oils and canvass before getting down to 
business. 
However, it is false to claim that this state of affairs, even though ubiqui-
tous in economics departments the world over, is essential for neoclassical eco-
nomics. The first signs that it need not be came with the literature on endoge-
nous preferences. Neoclassical economists increasingly sought to distance them-
selves from the assumption that preferences are fixed and exogenous. During the 
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past twenty five years or so, homo economicus has developed a capacity to adapt 
his preferences in response to past outcomes (see Bowles, 1998). However, 
while the assumption that current preferences are exogenous was dropped, they 
remained fully determining. Thus, instrumentalism was preserved albeit in a dy-
namic context. 
A more recent development has taken neoclassicism, and homo 
economicus, onto higher levels of sophistication. The advent of psychological 
game theory (see Rabin, 1993, and Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis, 2004, Ch. 
7) has brought on a reconsideration of the standard assumption that agents’ cur-
rent preferences are separate from the structure of the interaction in which they 
are involved. Suddenly, what one wants hinged on what she thought others ex-
pected she would do. And when these second order beliefs (her beliefs about the 
expectations of others) came to depend on the social structure in which the deci-
sion is embedded, the agent’s very preferences could not be linked just with out-
comes: they depended on the structure and history of the interaction as well.  
In view of the above, there is no future in criticisms of neoclassicism based 
on the charge that the latter must take for granted preferences which are either 
exogenous or independent of the agents’ socio-economic relationships. Critics 
toeing that line will be met with the scornful rejoinder that they criticise out of 
ignorance. However, our point that neoclassicism is still rooted in methodologi-
cal instrumentalism cannot be so dismissed. For even in the latest reincarnation 
provided by endogenous preferences and psychological game theory, homo 
economicus is still exclusively motivated by a fierce means-ends instrumental-
ism. He may have difficulty defining his ends, without firm beliefs of what 
means others expect him to deploy, but he remains irreversibly ends-driven.   
 
4. The third axiom of neoclassical economics: methodological equilibration 
 
The third feature of neoclassical economics is, on our account, the axiomatic 
imposition of equilibrium. The point here is that, even after methodological in-
dividualism turned into methodological instrumentalism, prediction at the macro 
(or social) level was seldom forthcoming. Determinacy required something 
more: it required that agents’ instrumental behaviour is coordinated in a manner 
that aggregate behaviour becomes sufficiently regular to give rise to solid pre-
dictions. Thus, neoclassical theoretical exercises begin by postulating the agents’ 
utility functions, specifying their constraints, and stating their ‘information’ or 
‘belief’. Then, and here is the crux, they pose the standard question: “What be-
haviour should we expect in equilibrium?” The question of whether an equilib-
rium is likely, let alone probable, or how it might materialise, is treated as an 
optional extra; one that is never central to the neoclassical project. 
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The reason for the axiomatic imposition of equilibrium is simple: it could 
not be otherwise! By this we mean that neoclassicism cannot demonstrate that 
equilibrium would emerge as a natural consequence of agents’ instrumentally 
rational choices. Thus, the second best methodological alternative for the neo-
classical theorist is to presume that behaviour hovers around some analytically-
discovered equilibrium and then ask questions on the likelihood that, once at that 
equilibrium, the ‘system’ has a propensity to stick around or drift away (what is 
known as ‘stability analysis’). 
It is quite remarkable that the above has been with us since the very begin-
ning. When A.A. Cournot constructed the first model of (oligopolistic) competi-
tion in 1838, he immediately noticed a lacuna in his explanation regarding the 
emergence of an equilibrium. Rather cunningly, instead of discussing this diffi-
culty, he studied what happens when we begin from that equilibrium. Would the 
system have a tendency to move away from it or was the equilibrium stable? The 
proof of its stability secured his place in the pantheon of economic theory. 
Moreover, it established this interesting practice: First, one discovers an equilib-
rium. Second, one assumes (axiomatically) that agents (or their behaviour) will 
find themselves at that equilibrium. Lastly, one demonstrates that, once at that 
equilibrium, any small perturbations are incapable of creating centrifugal forces 
able to dislodge self-interested behaviour from the discovered equilibrium. This 
three-step theoretical move is tantamount to what we, here, describe as methodo-
logical equilibration.  
Note that methodological equilibration is equivalent to avoiding (axiomati-
cally) what ought to be the behaviourist’s central question: Will rational agents 
behave according to the theory’s equilibrium prediction? Instead, the question 
becomes: If rational agents are behaving according to the theory’s equilibrium 
prediction, will they have cause to stop doing so? Note also that methodological 
equilibration has remained intact since 1838 and Cournot’s first use of it. To see 
this, consider the two great success stories to have come out of neoclassical eco-
nomics since WW2: General Equilibrium Theory and Game Theory. In neither 
case does the equilibrium solution spring naturally from the models’ assump-
tions.  
In General Equilibrium Theory its best practitioners state it quite categori-
cally: convergence to some general equilibrium can only be proven in highly 
restrictive special cases. More generally, it is not just difficult to demonstrate 
that a system of theoretical markets will generate an equilibrium in each market, 
on the basis of rational acts on behalf of buyers and sellers; rather, it is impossi-
ble! (See Mantel, 1973, and Sonnenschein, 1973,1974.) In Game Theory the 
same result obtains: in the most interesting socio-economic interactions (or 
games) common knowledge that all players are instrumentally rational seldom 
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yields one of the interaction’s Nash equilibria. Something more is required to 
bring on an equilibrium. That something comes in the form of an axiom that the 
beliefs of all players are consistently aligned at each stage of every game (see 
Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis, 2004, Chapters 2&3). This assumption is, of 
course, yet another reincarnation of methodological equilibration: for once we 
assume that agents’ beliefs are systematically and consistently aligned, they are 
assumed to be in a state of (Nash) equilibrium. Yet again, equilibrium is im-
posed axiomatically before stability analysis can test its susceptibility to pertur-
bations. Cournot’s spirit lives on… 
 
5. Three axioms, one neoclassical economics 
 
It is hard to imagine how any standardly trained economist could deny that her 
theoretical practices digress from the three methodological moves mentioned 
above:  Methodological individualism, methodological instrumentalism and 
methodological equilibration. For simplicity we shall henceforth refer to them as 
the neoclassical meta-axioms. Whether it is general equilibrium theory, evolu-
tionary game theory, non-Walrasian equilibrium theory, social choice theory, 
industrial economics, economic geography, new political economy, analytical 
Marxism, public choice economics etc., all mainstream approaches in these 
fields remain loyal to the three meta-axioms above.  
In fact, the meta-axioms are beginning to develop much closer, almost symbi-
otic, links with one another than was the case until fairly recently. Take for in-
stance, the attempts by psychological game theorists to create a sophisticated 
model of men and women, capable of drawing utility not only from socio-
economic outcomes but also from the means that bring them about. When homo 
economicus learns that the ends do not necessarily justify the means, he develops 
a welcome capacity to ponder, prior to acting, what others expect of him so that 
he can decide how much he values the various alternative outcomes.  
For example, when deciding on whether to act bravely in defence of some-
one in need, his second order beliefs (i.e. his beliefs  regarding what others ex-
pect of him) influence his estimate of the (psychological) cost of acting selfishly. 
To put it simply, his utility function cannot be defined independently of (a) the 
structure of the strategic interaction and (b) the beliefs that all participants 
would have in equilibrium. In this sense, methodological equilibration is no 
longer prior to methodological instrumentalism (as is the case in standard con-
sumer or game theory): the axiomatic imposition of equilibrium is not only nec-
essary in order to predict the interaction’s outcome but it is also essential in or-
der to define the instrumentally rational agents’ preferences! (See Hargreaves-
Heap and Varoufakis, 2004, Ch. 7 and Fehr and Gächter, 2000) 
  12 What Is Neoclassical Economics? 
It is, therefore, uncontroversial to state that every aggregate phenomenon 
scrutinised by neoclassical minds is explained increasingly and exclusively as 
some axiomatically imposed equilibrium emerging from the interaction of in-
strumentally rational individuals who are either optimising consciously (as in 
rational choice or game theory) or are drawn to such behaviour through a proc-
ess of ‘natural selection’ (as in, for instance, evolutionary game theory). The 
bottom line, then, is clear: despite all denials, there is such a thing as a body of 
social theory that subscribes to the three meta-axioms above and which we can 
legitimately, for want of a better term, label neoclassical.  
At this juncture, there is one move open to neoclassical economists who 
still insist that what they are doing ought not be labelled as anything other than 
scientific economics: they need to persuade us that the neoclassical method, i.e. 
models based on the  three meta-axioms, is the only proper method; which obvi-
ously implies that there is no distinctly neoclassical method after all, even once 
that method has been characterised as above. 
Effectively, they would have to adopt a rather extremist defensive posture: 
to claim that the combination of the three meta-axioms above is indispensable to 
any economic theory worth its salt; that the neoclassical method, as founded on 
the triptych of individualism, instrumentalism and equilibration, is not just one 
possible analytical strategy but that it is somehow uniquely and ontologically 
grounded in social reality. It would amount to a claim to the effect that all other 
economic approaches, including for instance Adam Smith’s, is not in the same 
scientific league as their own. Undoubtedly, many neoclassical economists think 
that (although few would state it in polite conversation.)  
Nonetheless, the truth status of that defence must be an empirical matter 
rather than a methodological one, and the defender of neoclassisism has to pro-
vide hard evidence concerning the actual, material processes of (a) how prefer-
ence orderings determine actions uniquely, and (b) how their reasoning skills, or 
social/natural selection, slice through indeterminacy to bring about an equilib-
rium. Needless to say, such extreme naturalism has no chance of being empiri-
cally supported. Even sophisticated empiricists like Karl Popper rejected the idea 
that the joint hypothesis of individualism and equilibrium can be tested empiri-
cally; they are, he rightly claimed, preconditions for knowledge rather than ob-
jects of knowledge. Hence there is no such thing as a ‘natural method’. The very 
thrust of the Enlightenment project rules it out of court. 
The last resort of the mainstream economist, who wants to defend the pre-
sumption that the three neoclassical meta-axioms are essential to any scientific 
analysis of the social economy, is to argue that the neoclassical method of ex-
planation, while not being a ‘natural method’, has nevertheless evolved histori-
cally as the most adequate method for studying a society of free, enlightened 
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individuals. That it is, in short, the only non-contradictory embodiment of the 
Enlightenment project itself. That, just as representative liberal democracy is a 
bad system of government but remains the best one available, neoclassicism has 
evolved as the best economic analysis that is consistent with the liberal human 
condition.  
However, such a rhetorical strategy can only work if it is accompanied with 
a sound evolutionary argument depicting the three meta-axioms as the unique 
‘attractor’ of liberal social science. Unfortunately, no such argument seems to be 
forthcoming. Instead, mainstream economics is perpetually reproducing itself 
through a series of metamorphoses that Ovid would have been jealous of. The 
resulting models gain in complexity, expand in scope, and move into areas hith-
erto untainted by the economist’ inquiring gaze. Nonetheless, all these models, 
in all their multiplying guises, share a well hidden, and almost completely un-
spoken of, foundation: the three meta-axioms above. The radical absence of a 
debate about them is, we shall argue below, essential to the discursive power of 
neoclassical economics. As for the latter’s aversion to pluralism, it is a natural 
by-product of this dance of veils whose purpose is to maintain neoclassicism’s 
discursive edge by keeping our eyes off the theory’s meta-axioms. 
 
 
6. Some thoughts on neoclassicism’s discursive power and its aversion to 
pluralism 
 
What does an intelligently dispassionate observer of neoclassical economics see? 
She sees an ever expanding technical literature, most of which she cannot com-
prehend. She sees an almost infinite series of mathematical models that explain 
diverse socio-economic phenomena as part of some equilibrium scenario which 
posits autonomous actors bringing on the phenomenon under study, often supra-
intentionally, through choices that are rational given everyone’s beliefs (even 
when the actions are self-defeating). She sees a series of career paths that are 
made generously available to those who participate in this global research pro-
ject. She sees economists the world over being taken seriously only to the extent 
that they speak this particular ‘language’. She sees the powers-that-be speak this 
very ‘language’. Finally, she sees enterprising academics in other social sciences 
adopting this ‘language’, in a transparent bid to share into neoclassicism’s dis-
cursive success. In short, the onlooker sees, correctly, power oozing out of the 
mainstream economists’ theoretical practices. There is only one thing she does 
not see: the three meta-axioms, none of which are visible to the naked eye. 
Note how instrumental to the discursive power of neoclassicism is the fact 
that its three foundational axioms are hidden from our onlooker’s view. For if they 
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were evident, she might start asking difficult questions for which, as we argued 
above, neoclassicism has no real answers (except to re-phrase its axioms). This 
helps explain, in more than one ways, the authoritarian dynamics and the disdain 
shown toward pluralism of Economics Departments which have either managed to 
rank highly within mainstream economics or are striving to do so.  
We suggest that there are two equally important types of explanation of 
neoclassicism’s evolution into an authoritarian research project that discourages 
pluralism: One is a type of intentional explanation while the second is a func-
tional explanation. The intentional explanation is simple enough and runs as fol-
lows: When an inquisitive graduate student, or academic, who has mastered neo-
classical technique but has started developing doubts, starts questioning the 
meta-axioms, she is effectively questioning the hegemony of her profession. At 
best, her queries and arguments are met with sympathetic nods, at worst with a 
great wall of dogmatic put down lines and an avalanche of advice to the effect 
that these are matters that she ought to worry about after retirement. Publishing 
in the ‘good’ journals is hard enough. Publishing articles which question the 
meta-axioms is even harder. Indeed, it takes a foolhardy young soul to jeopard-
ise a hard-earned career path in pursuit of the truth-status of one or more of the 
meta-axioms which allow the profession to flood the journals with mathematical 
models that are so highly regarded and so little discussed. And as is so often the 
case with dominant paradigms, self-censorship is the predominant vehicle for 
neoclassicism’s unimpeded march. 
The functional explanation adds an interesting twist to the same tale of in-
tellectual authoritarianism. If phenomenon X is functionally to explain the oc-
currence of phenomenon Y, this explanation has merit if and only if the follow-
ing four conditions are met (see Elster, 1982): (1) Y must be beneficial for some 
group of agents Z. (2) Members of group Z must be responsible for the practices 
that cause X but must not intend to bring Y about through practices that result in 
X; indeed, Z members must remain innocent of the causal link between X and Y. 
Lastly, (3) phenomenon Y, which is caused by X, must be shown to reinforce X 
through a feedback mechanism involving, unintentionally, members of group Z.  
In our case, Y is the discursive power of neoclassical economics, X are the 
practices which keep neoclassicism’s meta-axioms hidden, and Z is the set of 
neoclassical economists. Can a convincing functionalist explanation of how X 
causes Y be built along the lines sketched above? If it can, then we shall have an 
interesting (and possibly correct) explanation of why pluralism is absent from 
Economics Departments: its radical absence, which is guaranteed when an eerie 
silence engulfs the three neoclassical meta-axioms, emerges as a prerequisite for 
neoclassicism’s dominance. Let us now put together the basic elements of such 
an explanation. 
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Before we proceed further, it is important to note that the merit of this func-
tional explanation is that it is entirely consistent with a distaste for conspiracy 
theories. As it will transpire shortly, the offered explanation does not presume 
neoclassical economists in cynical pursuit of discursive power; no theorists are 
imagined who silence subversive voices within the profession so as to preserve 
the power vested in them by their models [see part (2) of the argument above 
which rules out such intentional cynicism]. In fact, our explanation works better 
when most neoclassical economists would have been (honestly) appalled at the 
thought that we suspect their practices as driven by anything other than scientific 
rigour. From experience, we can confirm that most neoclassicists believe 
strongly in the theoretical superiority of their models and may even have a moral 
commitment to pluralism. Nevertheless, even if we accept that these fine senti-
ments are all pervasive in the economics profession, our argument still stands. 
To render coherent the functional explanation of neoclassicism’s discursive 
power as the result of a general ‘silence’ regarding the three meta-axioms at the 
bottom of all neoclassical theory, we needed three arguments: The first [see (1) 
above] is that neoclassicism’s power is beneficial for neoclassical economists 
(this is self evident). The second [see (2)] is that neoclassical economists are in-
nocent of the charge that they are keeping quite on the three meta-axioms inten-
tionally, so as to enhance their method’s discursive power (we accept, therefore, 
their own denials that they would have conceivably done such a thing). The third 
piece of the jigsaw [see (3)] is the crucial one: we must now demonstrate that 
“phenomenon Y, which is caused by X, reinforces X through a feedback mecha-
nism involving, unintentionally, members of group Z”.  
In other words, it must be argued convincingly that the enhancement of 
neoclassicism’s discursive power, which is largely due to the hidden nature of its 
three meta-axioms, makes it even less likely that neoclassical economists will be 
open to a pluralist debate on their meta-axioms. Anyone who has worked in an 
Economics Department has surely experienced such a feedback mechanism. Re-
search funding in economics is vast compared to the trickle that finds its way to 
the ‘other’ social sciences. It would not be forthcoming if economists regularly 
experienced philosophical angst regarding the axiomatic foundations of their 
wares. Naturally, the bulk of the profession’s funding goes to practitioners who 
do not indulge in methodological debates; who simply ‘get on with the job’. No 
one wants to keep quite on the meta-axioms. They are just too busy building 
magnificent edifices on top of them, and being magnificently rewarded for it.  
Nobel laureate Vernon Smith almost apologised, in a recent article (see 
Smith, 2002), for entering into a methodological discussion of the work he de-
voted an extremely productive life to. This is typical of the fear of methodologi-
cal discussion instilled in the best and even the most liberal minds in the eco-
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nomics profession. By whom? By no one is the honest answer. The death of plu-
ralism in economics is a crime without a criminal. It died long ago as a result of 
a particular dynamic within the profession which, operating behind the backs of 
even neoclassical economists, encourages them to produce all sorts of models 
(even of altruism and revolution, see Roemer, 1985) but surreptitiously penalises 
any deviation from, or even explicit discussion of, the three meta-axioms. 
Of course, the pressing question is: Why are public and private funds so 
uncritically lavished upon what turns out to be no more than a religion with 
equations? Alas, this is a question that the present chapter cannot answer within 
a purely methodological context. For such an explanation we need to venture 
into political economy (see Arnsperger and Varoufakis, 2005, for an attempt).  
 
Epilogue 
 
Neoclassical economics, despite its incessant metamorphoses, is well defined in 
terms of the same three meta-axioms on which all neoclassical analyses have 
been founded since the second quarter of the 19
th Century. Moreover, its status 
within the social sciences, and its capacity to draw research funding and institu-
tional prominence, is explained largely by its success in keeping these three 
meta-axioms well hidden. The radical lack of pluralism in mainstream econom-
ics is, on this account, not to be blamed on illiberally minded practitioners. 
Rather, it is to be explained in evolutionary terms, as the result of practices 
which reinforce the profession’s considerable success through diverting attention 
from the models’ axiomatic foundations to their technical complexity and di-
verse predictions. A pluralist economics will remain impossible as long as the 
social economy rewards economists in proportion to their success in keeping 
their models’ foundations opaque. 
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Šta je neoklasična ekonomija? Tri aksioma odgovorna za teorijsko dostignuće, 
praktičnu irelevantnost i posledično, diskursivni potencijal 
 
Rezime: Rad nudi preciznu definiciju neoklasične ekonomije, temeljenu na tri aksioma 
koji čine njenu osnovu. Ova definicija je sveobuhvatna u smislu da uključuje kako neok-
lasične ekonomske modele sa kraja XIX veka, tako i današnje, znatno fleksibilnije i 
obuhvatnije modele. Rad potvrđuje da ovi aksiomi istovremeno (a) obezbeđuju osnove 
za uspeh neoklasičnog diskursa unutar društvenih nauka i (b) da su duboko uslovljeni 
svojim teorijskih ogradama. Štaviše, (a) i (b) međusobno se pojačavaju, s obzirom da 
neoklasični diskursivni potencijal (koji je i nastao najvećim delom usled prikrivene pri-
rode ova tri osnovna aksioma) čini manje verovatnom vođenje otvorene, pluralističke 
rasprave o sopstvenim teorijskim osnovama (odnosno, o tri aksioma koji ga podupiru).  
 
Ključne reči: Neoklasična ekonomija, Metodološki individualizam, Metodološki in-
strumentalizam, Metodološki ekvilibrijum 
 
JEL: A11, A14, B13, B41 
  18